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STEPPING DOWN
D. Brock Homby*
I left the Maine Supreme Judicial Court for the federal trial
court in 1990. At the time, I expected to miss the collegiality of
the appellate bench and the satisfaction of resolving legal issues
deliberately and studiously. But I looked forward to a more
active, less monastic, professional life, interacting with lawyers,
witnesses, and jurors, and gaining the opportunity to see if I
could manage a trial docket fairly, speedily, and efficiently.
As a former appellate judge, I knew that I should explain
my rulings as a trial judge. But I believed that I should do that
simply, and leave it to the appellate courts to elaborate upon the
law. I viewed it as my trial judge responsibility to decide even
complicated issues in a timely manner, doing the best I could,
but not trying to write for the law reviews or posterity. I would
become what a former Maine Supreme Court colleague, Justice
David Roberts, used to describe as "a working judge."
Has experience followed expectation? To answer the
question, I consider "then" and "now."
THEN
In 1990, when I became the sole federal trial judge in
Bangor, Maine, I spent virtually every available hour in the
courtroom. From my first trial, a criminal fraud trial of a former
Bangor mayor, to the host of ready and waiting civil cases, the
life of a federal trial judge was what I had anticipated: presiding
at trials; ruling quickly on motions to permit the cases to come
to trial; and dealing with difficult criminal sentencing issues.
Because I had temporarily left my family 135 miles behind
* United States District Judge, District of Maine; Associate Justice, Maine Supreme
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while my daughter finished her senior year of high school, I was
ready for the task-full days in the courtroom followed by
evenings of reading briefs and writing short decisions. There
was enough trial business that my Portland colleague came to
Bangor from time to time so that we could run joint trial lists
(nothing like the jeopardy of a trial, coupled with the uncertainty
of which judge you would get, to move the parties to settle even
the most difficult case).
I often felt insecure: What was the just sentence in a
criminal case? What was the proper result in high-profile cases
involving elections, or campaign finance, or the request of a
church group to use school premises?
I did miss the luxury of discussing a case with colleagues
and letting judgment mature over the course of seasoned
deliberations. But it was satisfying to set my own schedule, to
manage my own docket and cases so as to reduce the backlog,
and to meet with the local bar to generate joint ideas for
improving how the federal trial court should function.
I particularly enjoyed talking with jurors after they returned
a verdict, listening to their criticisms and comments, and
answering questions about the general operations of a federal
court.
I kept my judicial opinions short; I often delivered them
from the bench to speed the process and avoid the delays that
come with polishing a written product. I was confident that the
First Circuit would take care of the law-elaboration function for
me ... not to mention the error-correction function.

Now
In 2007, federal trials-particularly civil trials-have
become a luxury in Maine.1 Fifteen years ago, I was a tireless
advocate of alternative dispute resolution, both locally and
nationally. I used magistrate judges and my own efforts to settle
as many cases as I could, so that there would be time to try the
1. The decline of federal trials has been documented nationally, and is a long-term
trend. See e.g. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federaland State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Leg. Studies 459 (2004). There are, of
course, regional exceptions, particularly the southwest border courts dealing with huge
numbers of immigration and drug cases.
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cases that would not settle. I advocated settlement even during a
trial, often speaking to the parties in the presence of their
lawyers after excusing the jury for the day. No longer. Most
lawyers and clients now understand ADR thoroughly, and there
is little need to advocate it. The costs of litigation are such that
the parties almost always explore settlement fully before they
approach a trial date. I savor the civil trials I do get. I no longer
exert myself as much in spontaneous judicial settlement efforts,
although I do my best to facilitate settlement when I am asked to
do so. But there is not the same personal urgency to settle a case.
After all, I have time to try it. The available judge, jury, and
courtroom have always been the best settlement incentive; thus,
ironically, the decline in trials increases the incentive to settle,
because the threat of trial is even more certain and imminent.
Criminal trials, as well, have diminished severely. There,
federal judges never did have any role in encouraging
"settlements" (guilty pleas), because the Rules forbid it. But the
Sentencing Guidelines (even now that they are advisory),
together with mandatory minimum sentences, have created an
overwhelming incentive for a defendant to cooperate with the
prosecutor. Only then can the defendant get the prosecutor's
motion that permits a judge to go below the prescribed
sentencing level without provoking a prosecution appeal. The
result is that few defendants risk a trial, because conviction
brings the virtual certainty of a significantly longer sentence
than would result from a guilty plea.
So what am I doing in place of the trials? In part, I am
doing what I vowed not to do: I am writing long opinions on
issues of increasing complexity. Now, that is not just an
application of Parkinson's Law-work expands to fill the time
available for its completion-nor of the fact that life and
therefore lawsuits have become more complex. Several factors
contribute. For example, appellate judges sometimes apply their
own work model to trial judges, and increasingly demand more
elaboration of detailed reasons for the trial judge's decisions. If
that is an overstatement, it is certainly true that we trial judges
feel more confident that we will not miss a particular element in
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the ever present "multipartite" analysis2 for a given decision
point if we approach the topic in writing.
Then there is the growth of federal class actions. Both the
drafters of the Federal Rules and the courts of appeal have
imposed substantial and demanding requirements on trial judges3
to make detailed findings and to evaluate sophisticated issues.
Failing to do so in a written opinion carries a clear risk of
reversal and having to "do it over," the bane of every trial
judge's existence.
Ironically, a class action that settles (and most do) creates
even more work for the trial judge. According to the appellate
courts, the trial judge then becomes the fiduciary for the class in
evaluating the settlement, marshalling the information and
explaining to the appellate court (and often to the public in a
high profile case) why a particular settlement should be accepted
or rejected. That is most safely done in writing, canvassing the
host of factors identified by the courts of appeal.
Additionally, with the growth of federal multi-district
litigation, more of those cases have found their way to Maine.
Multi-district cases tend to have very complex issues that cannot
be resolved easily in an oral disposition or even a short opinion.
Finally, sentencing too has become more complicated.
Congress requires a written statement if a judge departs from the
Guidelines, and many judges find it advisable post-Booker 4 to
give a written explanation of why the advisory Guidelines do not
produce a sentence that fulfils the statutory purpose. The
Judicial Conference has devised a multi-page form that a federal

2. Professor Arthur Miller has argued persuasively that, since the Celotex trilogy,
federal judges have also granted an increasing number of summary judgments (too many,
he contends). Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:. Are the "Litigation
Explosion, " "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Clich~s Eroding Our Day in Court andJury
Trial Commitments? 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982 (2003). The grant of summary judgment,
unlike its denial, requires a detailed written opinion setting out both the facts and the law,
to avoid reversal.
3. See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (available at http://uscode.house.gov). The district judge
is required first to make findings about whether the class is large enough to make joinder of
all class members impracticable; whether there are questions of law or fact common to the
class; whether the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class; and whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). That is but the first step. Succeeding
sections of the Rule are even more complex. See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b), (c).
4. UnitedStates v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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judge must complete for each sentence, but sometimes it seems
preferable to write an opinion and attach it to the form as well.
Beyond the increased writing, there are other changes.
Before the Sentencing Guidelines, defendants released early
from prison were supervised on parole by the United States
Parole Commission. Now, parole has been abolished, we have
"real time" sentences, and the sentencing judge must impose a
period of supervised release to follow the sentence. The
Probation Office, an arm of the federal court, performs that postimprisonment supervision and, if there are violations, brings the
offender back before the sentencing judge for a new hearing and
new punishment. First, however, there is the paperwork of
warrant applications and perhaps the review of a consented-to
disposition such as compulsory drug treatment, home
confinement, a domestic violence program, or a halfway house.
So, as defendants sentenced years ago to federal prison emerge
and fail to overcome their drug or alcohol addiction, their
domestic violence, or their other criminal proclivities, they
demand a growing amount of federal judicial time, which is
spent resolving disputed facts and deciding what incremental
punishment is appropriate.
And there are the broader national efforts to improve
federal court administration. While administration is a fact of
every job, I have been surprised at the level of satisfaction 5 that
flows from working with colleagues on a national level and with
the dedicated professionals at the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts and the Federal Judicial Center in
Washington, D.C. Together, we have taken steps to improve the
management of justice within the federal judiciary. And there is
plenty of such work.
To sum it up, I now tell law clerks when I hire them that
their experience will be far more like that of appellate clerks
than it would have been in 1990, and that they will spend much
more time studying written briefs, listening to oral arguments,
and writing opinions than struggling with jury instructions and
5. My late colleague, Richard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit, also remarked upon the
opportunity to contribute through administrative service. See Philip S. Anderson, Richard
SheppardArnold,in 27 ALl Rptr. 5, 15 (Fall 2004) (also available at http://www.ali.org/ali/
R2701_07-MemorialMinutes.htm). Judge Arnold served in various Judicial Conference
roles, as have I.
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evidentiary rulings in the courtroom. Of course, when I tell them
this, I am talking about my own professional worklife. I do miss
the constant trial work. There really is nothing better than
watching good lawyers try a case in front of a jury.
But this is still a wonderful job!

